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Abstract
Above market clearing wages are shown to prevail as an outcome of a
game in which employers possess and employees lack the ability to coor-
dinate. It is established in a monopolistically competitive framework that
it may be optimal for individual ﬁrms to coordinate and restrict entry
of indirect competitors and thus increase proﬁts by paying above market
clearing wages as the higher wage bill need not outweigh the increase in
proﬁts due to entry restriction. Resulting unemployment is shown to be
socially costly. The paper notes that a tax on revenue of the incumbent
ﬁrms can be welfare improving. Finally, a new perspective is cast on the
issue of the real wage volatility and the business cycle.
1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to present a novel contribution to the understand-
ing of the genesis of unemployment. The paper shows that unemployment can
arise in an environment where coordination on the part of employers is feasible
whereas employees lack the ability to synchronize their actions. Speciﬁcally, in
an explicit monopolistic competition setting the paper shows that monopolis-
tically competitive proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms can choose to coordinate and pay
above market clearing wages in order to restrict entry by potential indirect com-
petitors as long as the elasticity of substitution between inputs in the production
function is suﬃciently large. The paper establishes that whenever such coordi-
nation takes place equilibrium unemployment arises as an outcome. Moreover,
it is shown that the coordination itself can be enforced in a dynamic equilibrium
setup with trigger strategies. Finally, the paper casts a new perspective on the
phenomenon of real wage rigidity.
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1The issue of unemployment has been central to macroeconomics for many
decades. The understanding of the origins of unemployment is based on two
competing theories: the eﬃciency wage model of Solow [42], Shapiro and Stiglitz
[38] and the search theoretic approach of Diamond [22] and Pissarides [34]. The
two approaches extensively elaborated in the literature that has followed de-
spite some mild criticism, like the bond critique of the eﬃciency wage model
or vacancy unemployed comovement in the search models, have been relatively
successful and have rightly become the centerpieces of modern macroeconomic
thinking. Unquestionably, there is little doubt that both motivational wages as
well as the frictional nature of the labor market are the key factors that lead
to the existence of unemployment. Nevertheless, the two approaches in their
purest forms do imply that the existence of unemployment is either unavoidable
as job search takes time and eﬃcient if the bargaining power is properly balanced
or in fact plays a role of a disciplining device and indirectly enhances welfare.
Agreeably the view that the presence of unemployment does not inhibit welfare
beyond the loss due to existence of a purely physical constraint or even individu-
ally rational economic constraint must be expressed with signiﬁcant reservation.
Accordingly, the paper complements the existing literature and presents an al-
ternative mechanism that leads to unemployment as an equilibrium outcome
that is socially costly.
The paper in built on two conceptual ideas and several technical assump-
tions. Speciﬁcally, as it was noted earlier the paper assumes that there exists an
asymmetry in the employers’ and employees’ abilities to coordinate and steer
the market outcomes, i.e., the paper not only departs from the concept of wal-
rasian markets, but it in fact gives the power to manage the labor market to
a coordinated group of proﬁt maximizing individuals. Moreover, the paper as-
s u m e st h a tp r oj e c t sd i ﬀer by type with some being more proﬁtable in the ex ante
sense than the others. On the technical part the paper assumes the presence
of nonlinearities in the form of ﬁxed costs. In addition, aggregate demand ex-
ternality, following Blanchard and Kiyotaki [15], as an outcome of monopolistic
competition is introduced into the model. Moreover, in the model the elasticity
between diﬀerent intermediate goods is assumed to be high consequently, the
overall, economy wide, proﬁts expand with the number of varieties available,
but proﬁts per ﬁrm, each delivering a single good, fall with the number of vari-
eties of goods delivered to the market. Consequently, new entry and resulting
indirect competition imposes a negative burden on the existing ﬁrms. Finally,
labor is assumed to heterogenous in nature with each variety of an intermediate
good requiring a speciﬁc type, skill, of labor in its production process.
This basic structure leads in a quite natural way to the existence of unem-
ployment in equilibrium that is socially costly. The mechanism can be described
as follows. Incumbent ﬁrms having an informational advantage over ﬁrms that
consider entry into the market can coordinate and pay an above market clearing
wage to individuals who possess skills of no value to the incumbent ﬁrms, but
who are productive if hired by a new entrant. Clearly, the incumbent ﬁrms incur
a direct loss as they hire unproductive workers. On the other hand by paying
an above market clearing wage they restrict entry by new entrants as some of
2them ﬁnd it unproﬁtable to enter and pay the above market clearing wage. A
smaller number of new entrants lowers the overall proﬁts, but rises the proﬁt
per ﬁrm. Naturally the incumbent ﬁrms must balance the two eﬀects: a rise
in proﬁts due to entry restriction and a rise in costs due to an extra wage bill
paid out to unproductive workers. It is shown that the ﬁrst eﬀect can dominate
and indeed incumbent ﬁrms can choose to coordinate and pay an above market
clearing wage and restrict entry and thus increase their overall net proﬁts. Nat-
urally, in the simplest case the coordination suﬀers in the static framework from
the free rider problem and in equilibrium it is enforced in a dynamic setting
with trigger strategies. The coordinated behavior of incumbent ﬁrms leads to
unemployment. Some agents are not hired in equilibrium even though there is
a fundamental demand for their skills and moreover some agents of the type
identical to those not hired actually are hired and receive wages in excess of
their direct productivity. It is shown that unemployment is socially costly and
be dealt with a proper tax policy on the incumbent ﬁrms. Moreover, the paper
establishes that the strategic behavior of the incumbent ﬁrms casts new light
o nt h ei s s u eo fr e a lw a g ev o l a t i l i t yo v e rt h eb u s i n e s sc y c l e .
The paper is organized as follows. Section (2) outlines the basic model. The
equilibrium properties of the model are developed in section (3). Section (4)
studies the dynamic properties of the model. The last section concludes.
2M o d e l
The model is developed in an explicit general equilibrium framework and is
based on the standard framework of monopolistic competition of Blanchard
and Kiyotaki [15]. The exposition of the model starts with the presentation of
a static version of the model followed by the description of a dynamic rendering
of the model.
2.1 The Static Case
It is assumed that there is a single ﬁnal consumption good consumed by all
agents in the economy. In addition, there exist a set of intermediate goods that
serve as productive inputs in the process of production of the ﬁnal consumption











The market for the ﬁnal consumption good is perfectly competitive. Contrary
to most formulations n is assumed to be an equilibrium variable rather than a
ﬁxed parameter and is determined by the number of potential entrants willing
to produce.
There are in total n1+nk intermediate goods available for production. How-
ever, not all of them are actually demanded. Speciﬁc a l l y ,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h e
demands for a number n1 of goods exist and are positive with probability q>1
2
3and do not not exist with probability 1 − q. Similarly, the paper assumes that
the demands for a number nk of goods exist and are positive with probability qk
and do not exist with probability 1−qk. Under these assumptions the aggregate










where xi is the indicator function and is equal to 1 if the actual realization if
the demand for good i is positive and is equal to 0 otherwise.
The production process of intermediate goods requires two inputs one of sec-
tor speciﬁc nature and the other of general nature. In particular, the production






where Li is the input of labor that is speciﬁc to the production of good i and
LG,i is the input of the general labor, equally ﬁt in the production processes of
all goods, used for production of good i. The markets for intermediate goods
are assumed to be monopolistic with at most one producer serving the market
for a single good and freely setting the quantity delivered to the market.
There exists a number n1 + nk of potential producers of the intermediate
goods. The producers become the owners of the proﬁt income that they earn




c − θ, if production is undertaken
c, if production is not undertaken , (4)
where θ represents a ﬁxed time invariant constant and c is the value of real
consumption of the ﬁnal consumption good. In other words, it is assumed that
producers if they choose to produce they receive a ﬁxed disutility costs of θ,b u t
at the same time they become the owners of the proﬁts and consequently can
aﬀord to purchase consumption c. On the other hand if a given producer chooses
not to produce she receives no income and cannot purchase any consumption,
but at the same time receives no disutility from production and her net utility
is 0. Naturally, this speciﬁc representation of the preferences implies an equilib-
rium cutoﬀ strategy on the part of producers. In particular, if expected proﬁts
from production in a given sector exceed pθ,w h e r ep denotes the price of the ﬁ-
nal consumption good consumption, then production is undertaken. Otherwise
the producer remains idle.
The economy is populated with a total supply of LG of general labor that
can be used for production of any intermediate good. In addition, for any
intermediate good i there exists a total supply of LS of skill speciﬁcl a b o rﬁtt o
produce the good and totally unproductive elsewhere, i.e., the gross supply of
skilled labor is (n1 + nk)LS. Laborers of all types enjoy consumption derive no
disutility from work and consequently devote all of their income to purchases of
the ﬁnal consumption good.
42.1.1 Equilibrium with no Market Restriction
The solution for the equilibrium does not involve any novel techniques. The only
complication stems from the individual demands for the intermediate goods be-




1−γ(1−α) with µ2. Observe that if production is undertaken of all in-















where pj,j∈ {1,k}, denotes the price of goods, it is identical for all goods in
equilibrium, for which the demand exists with probability qj ex ante and its
current realization is positive. For notational convenience the paper indexes all
sectors with the demand being positive with probability qj with a single index
j.
By assumption, the demand for a single intermediate good j is stochastic.





j with probability qj
0 with probability 1 − qj ,j∈ {1,k}, (6)
where D denotes the nominal value of the demand for the ﬁnal consumption












Again, j ∈ {1,k} and wj denotes the nominal wage of skilled labor in sector j
and w the wage of general labor the same in all sectors. Conditions (7) imply





w .M o r e o v e r , p r o ﬁt maximization in the ﬁnal







pj2 ,w h i c hw h e n
combined with the preceding relationship and the fact that the supply of the







.T h e v e r y
last expression in turn implies that in equilibrium there are only to possible
values depending on the likelihood of the demand being positive of wages paid
to speciﬁc labor. The two values are denoted with wk and w1. Similarly, there
are only two possible positive price levels for the intermediate goods. The two
are denoted with pk and p1 and are given by the standard formulae of markup





αα (1 − α)
1−αwα
j w1−α. (8)
The market clearing condition for the general labor LG = n1LG,1 +nkLG,k,
together with the fact that in equilibrium
LG,k
LG,1 = wk






leads to the following employment levels in the respective sectors
LG,j =
qjµ1
n1qµ1 + nkqkµ1 LG,j∈ {1,k}. (9)
Naturally, speciﬁc labor employed in each sector is equal to its supply, i.e.,
Lj = LS,j∈ {1,k}.
These standard relationships allow to establish that in equilibrium the fol-
lowing hold











ωj = γαqjµ1 ¡





where ω = w
p and ωj =
wj
p denote real wages paid to general labor and type j












Furthermore, the expected real values of proﬁts in the respective sectors can be
expressed as
πj =( 1− γ)qjµ1 ¡






To close the model in a consistent way it suﬃces to assume that the disutility
costs on the part of producers that arises from production is exactly equal to
the expected proﬁts in a type ksector, i.e., to assume that
(1 − γ)qkµ1 ¡




G = θ. (13)
Several immediate observations can be made. First of all, there is no unem-
ployment as all factors are employed. In addition, as long as the condition (13)
is met the analogous condition for ﬁr m st h a tf a c el e s sd e m a n du n c e r t a i n t yh o l d s
with inequality and actually all enter their respective markets. Moreover, both
output and the real wage of the general labor are increasing with the number
of varieties whereas the expected proﬁt in a single sector not necessarily so.
Speciﬁcally, if the value of
1−γ
γ −(1 − α) is negative then the expected proﬁts in
a single market fall with the number of overall number of markets and clearly
from the perspective of a single ﬁrm any additional entry is undesirable. On the
contrary, exit of the existing ﬁr m si sb e n e ﬁcial. It should be emphasized that in
the model irrespective of the value of
1−γ
γ − (1 − α) the overall, economy wide
proﬁts, actually do increase with the number of varieties. In what follows it is
assumed that the value of µ is negative, i.e.,




− (1 − α) < 0, (14)
i.e., real value of expected proﬁts in a single ﬁrm decreases with the number of
varieties.
62.1.2 Equilibrium with Market Restriction
The model as presented up to this point is very conventional and does not lead
to any new results. However, the observation made in the last paragraph of
the preceding subsection suggests the feasibility of the following strategy on the
part of producers. As proﬁts per ﬁrm do increase if the number of entrants
falls it may be beneﬁcial to restrict entry. How entry can be restricted? Note
that by assumption type k ﬁrms face an informational disadvantage and their
expected proﬁts are lower as the existence of the demands they deal with is
more uncertain. Could it be then beneﬁcial to coordinate and oﬀer a wage to
speciﬁc labor in sectors k that exceeds the market clearing wage in order to
d r i v es o m eo ft h et y p ek ﬁrms out of the market and thus restrict the entry.
Naturally, such a strategy increases the costs as ﬁrms that choose to follow it
must pay an above market clearing wage to individuals whom they ﬁnd totally
unproductive. On the other hand if entry is indeed reduced then the overall
proﬁts can actually increase as there is less indirect competition. Which eﬀect
dominates? This subsection focuses on determining the trade-oﬀ.A n y m o r e
detailed analysis requires that the conceptual assumptions needed must be made
explicit. Henceforth the paper assumes that.
Assumption #2: Firms have the ability to coordinate. In particular, a
group of ﬁrms can choose to enter a given market and hire freely on that market.
Workers do not have the ability to coordinate. In particular, workers cannot
in a coordinated manner refuse the wage that is oﬀered to them. They must
maximize their individual utility and consequently take the wage that is being
oﬀered.
There are a total of n1 ﬁrms that face positive demands with probability
q and a total of nk ﬁrms that confront positive demands with probability qk.
Assume that the n1 of type 1 ﬁrms coordinate and commit, not just threaten, to
enter type k labor markets and hire exactly (1 − φ)LS w o r k e r so ne a c hm a r k e t .
Naturally, the type 1 ﬁrms will pay the real wage that is needed to entice
(1 − φ)LS u n i t so ne a c hm a r k e to ft y p ek speciﬁc labor and presumably that
wage will exceed the market clearing wage given by (10.) This commitment
leaves the proﬁt maximization problem of ﬁrms in sectors k unchanged. The
ﬁrms still take the new wage as given and choose their inputs. However, the
wage paid to type k labor, given that now type k ﬁrms must compete with type
1ﬁrms for type k labor, is higher. In equilibrium, a higher than before real wage
lowers proﬁts of ﬁrms in sectors k and some of them choose not to enter as it
was assumed that the condition (13) held at the outset. Therefore, there will
be labor with sector speciﬁc skills, type k, that is not hired at all as some type
kﬁrms that demand type k skills simply opt out of the market. Consequently,
on any type k labor market fraction 1 − φ of available labor is hired by type
1 ﬁrms that ﬁnd type k l a b o rt ob eo fn oi n t r i n s i cv a l u ea n dt h er e m a i n d e r ,
the fraction φ, is either hired by the corresponding type k ﬁrm that actually
values that speciﬁcf o r mo ft y p ek l a b o ra n dc h o o s e st ob ea c t i v eo rr e m a i n s
unemployed.
Let n∗
k be the actual number of type k ﬁrms that choose to enter. Note that
7n∗
k can be as low as 0 a n da sh i g ha snk. Under the standing commitment of
the n1 type 1 ﬁrms the overall employment of type k speciﬁc labor in type k
ﬁr m si sg i v e nb yn∗
kφLS the employment of type k speciﬁc labor in type 1 ﬁrms
is given by nk (1 − φ)LS, which leaves the unemployed pool of (nk − n∗
k)φLS.
Can this pool actually arise?
As noted earlier the commitment on the part of the type 1 ﬁr m sd o e sn o ta f -
fect the ﬁrst order conditions of type kﬁrms. Moreover, the ﬁrst order conditions
of type 1 ﬁrms are not aﬀected either as the ﬁrms bear in eﬀect a ﬁxed cost in
the form of the wage bill to workers whom they ﬁnd unproductive. Accordingly,












Similarly, the ﬁrst order conditions from the ﬁnal consumption good produc-








The solution for the equilibrium is similar to the previous one except that now
it is necessary to account for the fact that not all type k speciﬁc labor is em-
ployed in type k sectors, while all of type 1 speciﬁc labor is employed in type 1
sectors, i.e., L1 = LS and Lk = φLS. Consequently the ratio of general labor









µ2 and in turn the levels of employment of general labor in































The real wages of the speciﬁcf a c t o r sc a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
ωR




















Moreover, the real expected proﬁts in a sector k ﬁrm take the form
πR









Note that free entry condition for type k ﬁrms implies that in an interior equi-









G = θ. (21)
8The real net proﬁto fat y p e1 ﬁrm takes a slightly more complicated shape as
the type 1 ﬁrms commit to hire the fraction (1 − φ) of type k labor. There are in
total n1 of type 1 ﬁrms and the the number of type k ﬁrms is nk, therefore, each
type 1 ﬁrm hires exactly nk
n1 (1 − φ)LS units of type k labor. The prevailing
wage is given by (19). Therefore, in equilibrium the expected real net proﬁts
are
πR




























and allows to express the ratio of real net proﬁts in a sector 1 ﬁrm as expressed
by (22) net of disutility θ when ﬁrms in type 1 sectors choose to coordinate,
πR
1 − θ, to real net proﬁts as expressed by (12) net of disutility θ when there is

















Not surprisingly the ratio takes the value of 1 when φ =1 , i.e., when there is no
artiﬁcial push of the real wage above the market clearing level. When φ assumes
values smaller than 1 there are two competing eﬀects. First of all, there is
positive eﬀect φ
−µ2 stemming from the proﬁt increase due to market restriction
and lesser entry. In addition, there is an additional eﬀe c tt h a td e c r e a s e st h er a t i o
as the wage bill to sectors k slack workers becomes larger. Which of the two
eﬀects dominates? There is no deﬁnite answer and in fact the model parameters
play a role. The derivative of (24) with respect to φ at 1 is equal to, up to a






qµ1 and it could actually be negative
implying that starting from φ =1a marginal decrease in φ can actually increase
per ﬁrm proﬁt. Moreover, the expression (24) possesses actually a maximum.
Let φarg max be the value of φ corresponding to the maximum. Furthermore, an









It turns out that it is possible to ﬁx the parameters of the model to have the
two things occur at the same time, i.e., to make the derivative negative at 1
and to have φmin <φ arg max < 1. In other words, there exists a possibility of an
interior maximum for the expression (24.) Moreover, in the subsequent sections
that consider a fully dynamic model it is shown that indeed this may be the
case. This section simply assumes that this happens to be. Figure (1) depicts
the expression (24) as a function of φ over the relevant interval.
Before discussing strategic implications stemming from the existence of an
interior maximum of (24) it is worthwhile to rationalize the existence in the ﬁrst
place. Fundamentally, the discrepancy, assumed, but realistic, in the informa-
tional contents of information sets between the incumbent ﬁrms and potential

















The Dependece of The Ratio on  φ
Figure 1: The Dependance of the Ratio of Proﬁts net of Disutility Costs θ with
Restriction to Proﬁts net of Disutility Costs θ without Restriction as a Function
of φ. α = 1
3, γ =0 .69, k =1 0 , q =0 .9,θ=0 .0559.
entrants is the key culprit. Incumbent ﬁrms face positive demands with prob-
ability q whereas potential new entrants with probability qk.A s a r e s u l t t h e
expected proﬁts of the incumbent ﬁrms exceed those of the potential entrants by





. If a coordinated market restriction occurs then two
types of ﬁr m se x p e r i e n c ea ni n d i r e c tg a i ni np r o ﬁts due to aggregate demand
externality as the number of varieties is lowered. However, the gain for the type
1 ﬁr m si sp r o p o r t i o n a lt oqµ1 whereas for the type k ﬁrms to qkµ1. In addition,
type k ﬁrms, potential entrants, experience a loss due to a larger wage bill as
there is an artiﬁcially high wage being paid out to type k labor and that loss is
proportional to qkµ1. A tt h es a m et i m et y p e1 ﬁrms do experience a loss as they
commit themselves towards hiring individuals that are unproductive from their
perspective. However, the loss is proportional to qkµ1 as the extra wage bill is
paid out to type k labor. Consequently at the margin type k ﬁrms experience a
gain proportional to qkµ1 and a loss that is proportional to qkµ1.A tt h em a r g i n
the two actually do balance as the free entry condition (21) must hold and type
k ﬁrms remain indiﬀerent. On the other hand the gain for type 1 ﬁr m si sp r o -
portional to qµ1 whereas the loss is proportional to qkµ1 and there is a natural
w e d g eb e t w e e nt h eg a i na n dt h el o s s .I tt u rns out that provided that some addi-
tional proportionality constants, the case in equilibrium, assume proper values
the wedge can be actually positive and at the margin it is beneﬁcial to type 1
ﬁrms to coordinate and restrict entry. The distribution of employment of type
10Type k Labor Hired by Type 1 Firms
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Type k Labor 
Figure 2: The Actual Engagement of Type k Labor.
k labor is depicted in ﬁgure (2).
Naturally, in the current setup coordination on the part of type 1 ﬁrms
increases their net proﬁts, but cannot be supported as an equilibrium outcome
as it is individually rational for each type 1 ﬁrm to deviate from cooperation
and release its unproductive, type k, workers and thus save on the wage bill
i r r e s p e c t i v eo ft h eb e h a v i o ro ft h er e m a i n i n gt y p e1 ﬁrms. Consequently, in
the static context coordination and hence unemployment cannot occur. On the
other hand it is straight forward to establish that in a simple repeated game the
cooperation can be enforced with standard trigger strategies and unemployment
can be an outcome. The following section studies the issue in a more detailed
manner.
3 Dynamic Equilibrium
The variables n1 and nk were assumed to be exogenously given and naturally
in the static model time invariant. This section makes speciﬁc assumptions on
the process that governs the evolutions of variables n1 and nk. Primarily, the
process is chosen for its technical simplicity and is thought of as one resembling
the life cycle of a single product. However, the results need not obtain for an
arbitrary process. In particular, it is assumed that any type 1 good that is
demanded with probability q in period t remains a type 1 good in period t +1
if the demand for the good is positive in period t.M o r e o v e r , a t y p e 1 good
demanded with probability q in period t turns into a type k good in period
11t +1if the demand for the good does not exist in period t.A t y p e k good
that is not demanded in a given period remains a type k good in the following
period. In equilibrium it may be the case that not all type k ﬁrms choose to
enter and undertake production. For technical simplicity, it is assumed that
type k ﬁr m st h a td on o te n t e ri nag i v e np e r i o dr e m a i nt y p ek in the following
period. Finally, type k ﬁrms that enter in a given period for which the demand
turned out to be positive turn into type 1 ﬁrms in the following period. As it
was noted it may be the case that not all type k ﬁrms enter in a given period1.
Let ψt ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of type k ﬁrms that choose to enter in period t.
M a t h e m a t i c a l l y ,t h ep r o c e s sc a nb ed e s c r i b e da saM a r k o vp r o c e s sa n dc a nb e






k =( 1 − q)nt
1 + ψt(1 − qk)nt
k +( 1− ψt)nt
k.
The process is to capture a very basic notion that demands for speciﬁc goods
can expire and that there is a positive chance that goods that were demanded in
the past and are no longer demanded can be demanded again in the future. The
agents in a given period are assumed to know the process (25), but are assumed
to take the contemporaneous values of nt
k and nt
1as given when making decisions
in period t. However, the agents do take into account that the equilibrium





k,A,a n dV t
k,I denote the value of a type 1 ﬁrm, type k ﬁrm that
c h o o s e st ob ea c t i v ea n dt h ev a l u eo fat y p ekﬁrm that refrains from entering a
given market. Assuming that the future payoﬀs are discounted at the rate β it
is straightforward to establish the following dynamic relationships
V t
1 = π1 − θ + qβV t+1





















The processes describing the evolution of the distribution of project types (25)
as well as the values of diﬀerent states (26) admit the existence of a steady state.
Speciﬁcally, by choosing a proper value of θ it is possible to ensure that there
exists a steady state in which the owners of type k projects are just indiﬀerent
between entering and producing and staying inactive, i.e., a steady state with
V t
k,A = V t
k,I.
The extension of the time horizon allows for the determination of the steady




1−q+ψqk, where the overall number of
potential projects is normalized to 1. Moreover, in the steady state where
type k ﬁrms are just indiﬀerent between entering and staying idle the values of
diﬀerent projects take the form Vk,A =0 , Vk,I =0 ,a n dV1 = π1−θ
1−qβ. Finally,
1It may be even the case that not all type 1 ﬁrms choose to enter. For expositional purposes
this option is ignored. However, in all simulations presented in the text it is never the case
that type 1 ﬁrms remain voluntarily idle.
12the indiﬀerence between entering and not entering on the part of type k ﬁrms
requires that
θ − πk =
qkβ
1 − qβ
(π1 − θ). (27)
The condition (27) allows for an explicit determination of ψ as a function of
the parameters of the model and θ in particular. It is straightforward to verify
that in equilibrium, as expected, ψ is decreasing with θ and increasing with 6 β.
Moreover, as compared to the static case ψis higher as type k ﬁrms are willing
to tolerate a one period negative ﬂow in utility in expectation of positive ﬂows
in subsequent periods. To simplify notation it is assumed in what follows that
the parameters of the model are such that ψ determined by the condition (27)
is equal to 1, i.e., all type k ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between entering and not and
all enter.
The introduction of an explicit time dimension in the model has not brought
any new insights if one concentrates on the nonrestricted case. The situation
c h a n g e sw h e nc o o r d i n a t i o no nt h ep a r to ft y p e1 ﬁr m si nag i v e np e r i o di s
allowed. Note that if coordination in period t is permitted then coordination not
only increases the current level of net proﬁts as shown in the preceding section,
but it also increases future proﬁts as coordination and entry restriction in period
t inﬂuences the number of type 1 ﬁrms in periods t +1and beyond and lowers
future indirect competition. Naturally, it is assumed that if coordination occurs
then coordinating ﬁrms do take into account their impact of their decisions
on future distribution of project types and at the same time they treat the
contemporaneous values of nt
1 and nt
k as predetermined.
Observe that ψt need not be equal to 1 whenever coordination occurs. The
evolution of project types can be now described with (25) with ψt being the
result of an equilibrium strategy played by type k ﬁrms, which in fact is to enter
with probability ψt and not to enter with probability 1−ψt. The value functions
for a single ﬁr mc a nn o wb ed e s c r i b e dw i t h( 2 6 )w i t ht h eﬁrst expression replaced
with
V t





k LS + qβV t+1
1 +( 1− q)β max(V t+1
k,A ,Vt+1
k,I ). (28)
Note that the values now depend also on φt. Presumably, one should consider
φt a choice variable on the part of coordinating type 1 ﬁrms and allow type 1
ﬁrms to choose φt (each period) to maximize the value of a type 1 ﬁrm. Indeed
this is assumed in to be the case in the subsequent section. This section has
a more restricted scope and aims only at showing feasibility of unemployment,
i.e., it shows that type 1 ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to coordinate and to create
unemployment rather than not without making any suggestion that the actual
degree of coordination is the most desirable one on the part of type 1 ﬁrms.
In a steady state where type k ﬁrms are just indiﬀerent between entering
and not entering it is necessarily the case that Vk,A = Vk,I =0 .In addition,
the value of a type 1ﬁrm is given by V1 =
πR
1 −θ
1−qβ . Furthermore, the indiﬀerence
13b e t w e e ne n t e r i n ga n dn o to nt h ep a r to ft y p ekﬁr m si m p l i e st h a t





1 − θ), (29)
which deﬁnes ψasa response to φ chosen by type 1 ﬁrms. Finally, the description
of the steady state is completed with the steady state expression for n1 as a
function of ψ,i . e . ,n1 =
qkψ
1−q+qkψ. Before proceeding further, observe that from
the perspective a type 1 ﬁrm the likelihood of staying a type 1 ﬁrm in the
subsequent period is independent of any speciﬁca c t i o n st h eﬁr mt a k e sa si ti s
simply equal to q. However, the continuation values do depend on the state
variables and in particular if in period t ﬁrms choose a small value of φt (a
signiﬁcant push of the real wage above the market clearing level) then there is
little entry, ψt is small, and the number of type 1 ﬁrms in the future is smaller
as a smaller proportion of type k ﬁrms turns into type 1 ﬁrms making future per
ﬁrm proﬁts larger. Clearly this additional gain, as compared to the static case,
leads type 1 ﬁrms to restrict entry even further, i.e., to choose a smaller φt in
order to limit indirect competition in the future. As argued earlier at the same
time type k ﬁrms are more reluctant to stay idle as the chance of becoming a
type 1 ﬁrm is qk if production is undertaken and being active gives a chance for
an increased continuation value. Other things equal this should lead to a more
costly entry restriction on the part of type 1 ﬁrms and a larger φt selected in
equilibrium. There are two competing eﬀects with the former being dominant
as the higher continuation values for type 1 ﬁrms are discounted with qβand for
type k ﬁrms only with qkβ. Therefore, one can expect more entry restriction
and more unemployment in the dynamic case than in the static case. Figure (3)
presents the steady state dependence of ψ on / φ and the corresponding steady
state value of the value of a type 1 ﬁrm V1 when coordination takes place relative
to the value with no coordination is present as a function of φ. Naturally, as both
graphs reveal there is range of the values of φ for which a steady state exist and
more over there exists a range of values of φ for which coordination actually
increases the steady state value of a type 1 ﬁrm. Naturally, the two graphs
indicate that certain steady states with coordination and market restriction
are feasible. Obviously, consistency requires that coordination itself be a part
of equilibrium, i.e., rather be an outcome than assumed. This is attained by
considering strategic interactions between type 1 ﬁr m si na ni n ﬁnite horizon
game with cooperation enforced on the path with trigger strategies.
To close the exposition of the steady state analysis one must verify that the
equilibrium that has been constructed can be supported by trigger strategies as
the simple static solution suﬀers from a severe free rider problem. Before arguing
that indeed the equilibrium can be in fact supported with trigger strategies it
is necessary to address a methodological issue. In fact throughout the paper
is organized around the notion of an inﬁnite number of atomistic agents as a
key building block. This is done for two technical reasons. First of all, the
monopolists’ pricing decisions can be reﬂected in a simple analytic form as a
ﬁxed markup over the marginal cost. In addition, the law of large numbers can
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Figure 3: The Dependence of ψ on φ and the Value V1 on φ in the Steady State.
φ is Treated as a Parameter of the Model. α =1 /3.5,γ=0 .9,β =0 .95,q=0 .85,
and k =8 .
be applied in dealing with the evolution of project types over time. However,
admittedly, the assumption of agents being atomistic makes a discussion of
strategic interactions a conceptual challenge. Nevertheless, the paper keeps the
initial assumption and treats the atomistic agents as a group that can interact
strategically. Speciﬁcally, the paper assumes that agents can play the following
strategies: a type 1 ﬁrm does hire nk
n1 (1 − φ)LS units of type k labor and pays
an above market clearing wage as long as all type 1 ﬁrms do that; as soon as a
single type 1 ﬁrm deviates then all type 1 ﬁrms switch to the punishment phase
and pay market clearing wages in all future periods.
In verifying that a given steady state solution can indeed be supported with
trigger strategies one encounters two technical problems. First of all, equilibrium
values of φ and ψ do depend on β and q and it is not possible to invoke a folk
theorem for repeated games. Moreover, the distribution of project types does
change whenever the punishment phase is triggered. Nevertheless, it is still
trivial to verify that no agent wants to deviate if the economy happens to be
oﬀ the path and the punishment phase has been triggered. The situation by far
more intricate on the path. Nevertheless, it can be shown, detailed exposition
in Appendix A, that there are values of φ for which the steady state can be
supported with trigger strategies.
In this subsection it has been established that there exists, trigger strategy
enforced, steady states with a coordinated market restriction and consequently
unemployment. However, the degree of coordination has been treated as a













The Value of a Type 1 Firm: the Unrestricted Case
Figure 4: The Value Function of a Type 1 Firm
parameter. The following subsection relaxes the latter assumption and allows
type 1 ﬁrms to consider φ a choice variable.
4D y n a m i c s
The purpose of this section is to analyze the responsiveness of the economy
with coordinated market restriction to technology shocks. Speciﬁcally, the sec-
tion focuses on identiﬁcation of dynamics that are due purely to the existence
of coordinated market restriction and are absent when the labor market func-
tions eﬃciently. First the paper starts with an analysis of the technology shocks
induced dynamics in an economy with no artiﬁcial unemployment and then it
performs an analogous analysis in an economy with coordinated market restric-
tion.
4.1 Economy with no Market Restriction
Recall that the set of Bellman equations tying the continuation values is given
by the system of equations (26). Moreover, under the assumption2 that in
the steady state all type k ﬁrms are just indiﬀerent between entering and not
entering and all actually choose to enter, i.e., equation (27) is satisﬁed with ψ
equal to 1 the value function of a type 1 ﬁrm is presented in ﬁgure (4).
2This should be the case in the truly long run as one should not expect, given an option
to retrain, a permanent skill mismatch.



























































Figure 5: Technology Shocks Induced Percentage Deviation of the Total Em-
ployment and the Average Wage Relative to the Respected Steady State Values.
As expected the value function decreases with n1, i.e., the larger the number
of indirect competitors the smaller the value of a single ﬁrm. Naturally, the
cumulative value of all type 1 ﬁrms does increase with n1, but at a rate smaller
then the rate of increase of n1 and consequently the value of a single ﬁrm falls
with n1.
The economy’s responsiveness to technology shocks can be illustrated best in
a simple comparative-static-like exercise. Assume that the economy is initially
in the steady state and at time t it is hit with a transitory technology shock.




and then returns to its original form given by (3) in period t +1 . Naturally,
this speciﬁc form implies that technological disturbances potentially inﬂuence
the equilibrium at time t and consequently the distribution of project types in
the subsequent periods, but leave the functional form of the continuation values
unaﬀected. Figure (5) present the evolution of total employment, both skilled
and general, as a function of A in period t and the average real wage, given by
ω =
ωLG + ω1n1LS + ωkn∗
kLS
LG + n1LS + n∗
kLS
, (31)
as a function of A,w h e r en∗
k = nkψ
∗ denotes the actual number of type k project
r u na tag i v e np o i n ti nt i m e .
17Clearly, as the economy is assumed to be initially in the steady state in which
all type k ﬁrms are just indiﬀerent between entering and staying idle and all
choose to enter a positive shock does not increase employment and leads only to
a wage increase. On the other hand a negative shock lowers both employment
and the average wage as inferior technology drives some of type k ﬁrms of the
market (in equilibrium all type k ﬁrms are still indiﬀerent between entering and
staying idle, but some of them stay out ψ<1.)
4.2 Economy with Market Restriction
It was shown earlier that steady state equilibria with a coordinated market
restriction did exist. However, the degree of coordination, market restriction,
φ was assumed to have been a parameter of the model. Naturally, to make
the study of shock induced dynamics meaningful it is necessary to endogenize
φ. The most natural manner to proceed is to assume that type 1 ﬁrms choose
φ to maximize the value of their ﬁrms. Naturally, this implies that the set of
Bellman equations must be modiﬁed further with equation (28) replaced with
V t
1 =m a x
{φt}






k LS + qβV
t+1






In the process of maximization in (32) agents treat the contemporaneous
state variable nt
1 as given. However, agents do know that a speciﬁcc h o i c eo fφt
inﬂuences the fraction ψt of type k ﬁrms that choose to enter in period t and
consequently the distribution of future project types, i.e., agents rationally take
into account the functional dependence of ψt on φt as well as other variables.
For notational simplicity let Π1 (φt,ψ t,n t




n1 (1 − φt)ωR
k LS be the
real net value of the utility ﬂow of a type 1 ﬁrm. In addition, let φ
∗
t be the
optimal choice made by type 1 ﬁrms and ψ
∗
t be the optimal reaction on the
part of type k ﬁrms at time t. Note, that in general ψt depends on φt and
on nt. Moreover, in an interior steady state where restriction occurs the values
Vk,A and Vk,I are both zero. Consequently, along the equilibrium path, with an


















i.e., at any point in time the choice of φ
∗
t must be optimal. Naturally, all partial
derivatives are evaluated at the optimum. Moreover, along the optimal path
the equation (32) must naturally be satisﬁed, i.e.,
V t
1 = Π1 + qβV t+1
1 , (34)
where the actual value of n
t+1
1 is induced with the choice of φ
∗
t.M o r e o v e r ,
diﬀerentiating (34) with respect to nt
1 at the optimum along the equilibrium





















18As assumed, along the equilibrium path type k ﬁrms must actually be in-
diﬀerent between entering and staying idle, i.e., as in an interior steady state




where Πk = πk −θ is the net per period utility ﬂow of a type k ﬁrm, must hold.
Naturally, in general the indiﬀerence condition (36) deﬁnes an implicit func-
tional3 dependence of ψt on φt and on nt. Condition (36) when diﬀerentiated



































describe implicitly the equilibrium path along which it is equally beneﬁcial to
operate a type k as to remain idle. Let φ
∗ and ψ
∗ be the corresponding steady
state values. In the steady state the numbers of type 1 project and type k






1−q+ψ∗qk. The relationship (34)
together with the condition (36) allow to determine an analytic expression for ψ
∗
as a function of φ
∗, n1 and nk . However, in the steady state the values of n1 and
nk do depend on ψ
∗ itself. Unfortunately, the two relationships are nonlinear
and without imposing further restrictions on the parameter values it is necessary
to obtain the relationship between ψ
∗ and φ
∗ with numerical techniques. Figure
(??), dashed line, presents the dependence for a set of reference parameters.
Combining the steady state equivalents of (33),(35) and (36) with the steady
state expressions for n1 and nk permits to obtain a new relationship tying φ and
ψ. Figure (6), solid lines, presents the relationship.
It is clear that indeed there are interior solutions in the steady state, i.e.,
there exists a φ diﬀerent than 1 and the corresponding value of ψ for which the
discounted value of the utility ﬂow of a type 1 ﬁrm is maximized. In other words,
there exists steady states with type 1 ﬁrms restricting employment of the speciﬁc
labor and creating unemployment. Naturally, it must be emphasized that the
steady states may correspond to only to LOCAL rather than GLOBAL maxima4
in (32), nevertheless, they do exist.
In summary, in an interior steady state equilibrium type 1 ﬁrms commit to
hire the proportion 1 − φ of type k labor. The equilibrium wage paid out to
employed type k labor is equal to the markup of
1−φ
φ over the market clearing
wage that prevails when φ =1 . Higher than the market clearing wage dis-
courages type k ﬁrms from entering and in fact only a fraction ψ do enter and
the remainder remain idle. Consequently, if the steady state number of type k
3It can actually be a correspondence.
4Some of them can even represent minima rather than maxima.
19φ
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The Steady State Dependece of  ψ on φ











Figure 6: The Dependence of φ on ψ in an interior Steady State. α =1 /3.5,γ=
0.9,β =0 .95,q=0 .85,a n dk =8 .
ﬁrms is equal to nk then the total amount of skilled speciﬁc labor of type k is
equal to nkLS and the fraction nkψφLS is hired by type k ﬁrms, the fraction
nk (1 − φ)LS is hired by type 1 ﬁrms and the rest nk (1 − ψ)φLS remain unem-
ployed. This unemployed pool is created artiﬁcially by a speciﬁcc h o i c eo fφ.I t
it is worth noting that some type k ﬁrms choose not to operate and consequently
create structural unemployment as some type k l a b o ri sn o th i r e de v e nt h o u g h
there exists a fundamental demand for the skills of type k unemployed labor.
Naturally, in the steady state the unemployed pool evolves as some demands
expire and other reaper in accordance with the process (25). However, at any
point in time there are exactly nk (1 − ψ)φLS units of slack type k labor.
In general the system of Bellman equations deﬁning the continuation values
admits multiplicity of equilibria. Accordingly, the actual paths that the economy
follows do depend on both the initial position and the expectations held by
both type 1 and type k ﬁrms. The paper shuns away from the discussion of
equilibrium selection and the role of expectations and limits its attention to a
local analysis around a speciﬁc steady state. The value function of a type 1
ﬁrm in the neighborhood of an interior steady state with type k ﬁrms being
indiﬀerent between entering and staying idle is depicted in ﬁgure (28).
Two important observations can be made. First of all the value function is
locally decreasing. This is primarily due to the assumption that µ is negative.
Moreover, perhaps not surprisingly the value of a type 1 ﬁrm is higher when
type 1 ﬁrms choose to coordinate than steady state value of a type 1 ﬁrm when
type 1 ﬁrms choose not to coordinate (the dashed line.) Figure (8) shows the










Figure 7: The Value of a Type 1 Firm in the Steady State. α =1 /3.5,γ =
0.9,β =0 .95,q=0 .85,a n dk =8 .
equilibrium choices of φ and ψ as functions of n1. It needs to be reiterated
that issues pertaining to multiplicity of equilibria, such as expectations and
equilibrium selection, allow both φ and ψ to be considered optimal only in the
local sense. Nevertheless, the given choice of φ as a function of n1 as shown in
ﬁgure (8) is locally optimal and no agent has an incentive to deviate.
As described in the preceding subsection technology shocks do inﬂuence
both the level of employment and the real wage. The impact of technology
s h o c k si nt h ec a s ew i t ht y p e1 ﬁrms choosing to coordinate can be described in
an analogous comparative-static-like5 exercise. For that purpose assume that
starting from the steady state the economy is hit with a technology shock at





for one period and then returning to its normal form starting from period t+1
onwards. As before, this simple shock structure does not aﬀect the functional
forms of the continuation values and the economy’s responsiveness to technology
shocks can be analyzed easily. Figure () shows the level of total employment
and the average real wage, given by,
ωR =
ωRLG + ωR
1 n1LS + ωR
k n∗
kφLS + ωR
k nk (1 − φ)LS
LG + n1LS + n∗
kφLS + nk (1 − φ)LS
(40)
5An obvious alternative would be to add a new state variable and model the value functions
as functions of both A and n1, i.e., to set V t






. The paper follow the simpler
approach to economize on computational complexity.






The Equilibrium Dependence of Optimal  φ and ψ on n
1
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Figure 8: Optimal φ and ψ as functions of n1. α =1 /3.5,γ=0 .9,β =0 .95,q=
0.85,a n dk =8 .
as a function of A,w h e r en∗
k = nkψ is the actual number of type k ﬁrms that
choose to enter.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The literature that deals with the issue of unemployment has been very vivid
in the last quarter of the last century and the ﬁrst several years of the new
millennium. Two paradigms, search models and eﬃciency wage theories, that
have shaped the thinking about the issue of unemployment have led to an im-
mense increase in the understanding of the origins of unemployment. Moreover,
the contributions of the last twenty ﬁve years not only have proven to be of
conceptual value, but also have been used extensively in a wide range of policy
tools. Nevertheless, it appears that there is strong demand for an alternative
explanation of the presence of unemployment as the notion that unemployment
can cause no welfare costs as long as the bargaining processes is properly bal-
anced beyond those stemming from a purely physical constraint and the notion
that unemployment serving as a as a credible deterrent can be actually wel-
fare improving are seldom expressed unconditionally. This paper using several
technical and two conceptual assumptions, one of them being the assumption of
the ability to manage the market outcomes by a coordinated group of market
players, aims at responding to the expressed demand.
The model presented in the paper shows that it may be optimal for an
22individual ﬁrm, as long as others follow the suite, to oﬀer wages that exceed
the market clearing level even if workers to which the oﬀer is made happen to
be totally unproductive from the perspective of the ﬁrm and thus to create a
disequilibrium in the labor market. The reason for that is a simple one and
amounts to an observation that with higher than the market clearing wage it
may be too costly for potential entrants who face an informational disadvantage
to enter and to compete with the incumbent ﬁrms. Consequently, when entry
is restricted by higher than the market clearing wages proﬁts can actually be
higher even though ﬁrms’ costs are higher due to a larger wage bill. The co-
operation between the incumbent ﬁrms is enforced in a dynamic setting with
trigger strategies. The paper shows that the presence of unemployment is so-
cially costly. It establishes that a revenue tax on the incumbent ﬁrms can spur
competition and increase welfare. Finally, the paper adds a new insight into the
debate on real wage volatility over the business cycle.
The paper should be viewed purely as a theoretical contribution. Its goal is
to complement rather than to challenge the existing literature. The key results
signal rather a feasibility of certain outcomes than an outright assertion that
the described situation actually takes place.
A Appendix
The purpose of this appendix it to show that agents may indeed ﬁnd it optimal
to stay on the path and continue cooperation rather then to deviate and trigger
the punishment phase. As it was noted earlier the evaluation of the continuation
values oﬀ the path can be potentially a formidable task for two reasons. First
of all, the distribution of project types evolves from the initial steady state to
the ﬁnal steady state. Secondly, agents’ expectations do inﬂuence the evolution
process. Therefore, before any explicit calculation is made it is necessary to
precisely deﬁne the evolution oﬀ the path.
Observe that once the punishment phase is triggered then there arises a
possibility of a long run steady state in which at any point in time all type k
ﬁrms choose to enter, i.e., ψLR =1 . Moreover, the approach path along which
at any point in time all type k ﬁrms enter, i.e., ψt =1 is also feasible. The
following several lines of algebra prove this point formally.
Let the initial steady state be characterized with (φ0,ψ0) and the correspond-








Note that if the punishment phase is triggered at time 0 then the evolution of
project types can be described with, under the assumption that ψt = ψ0 at time
0 and ψt =1at all future periods,
n1
1 = qn0





1 + qk(1 − nt
1).








1−q+qk. Moreover, as n1
1 = n0
1 <n LR
1 the approach to






































with ψt = ψ0 at 0 and ψt =1afterwards.
Clearly, the path is feasible. It remains to establish that the path is payoﬀ
consistent, i.e., it needs to be shown that the evolution of ψ
0
ts,w i t hψt = ψ0 at 0
and ψt =1thereafter, reﬂects optimality on the part of type k ﬁrms. Naturally,
the following dynamic equation must be satisﬁed once the punishment phase
has been triggered
V t
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t+1



























Note that in the long run, it is the case that V1 >V k,I = Vk,A.N o t e t h a t
the path along which at all dates except the ﬁrst one ψt =1requires that
∀t : V t
k,A ≥ V t
k,I. Assuming this to be true one reduces the system of dynamic
equations (44) to
V t
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Now using (43) it is straight forward to show that ∀t : V t
1 ≥ V
t+1







k,I .M o r e o v e r ,i tm u s tb e










where Wt = V t
1 − V t
k,A.c l e a r l yWt must be positive for all t as in the long run
it is positive and (48) holds. Moreover, equation (48) implies as (43) holds that













− θ + q
kβW
t+1. (49)
Again (43) and the fact that Wt ≥ Wt+1 for all t imply that








Now given that in the long run Vk,A = Vk,I it must be that ∀t : V t
k,A−V t
k,I ≥ 0.
Hence, the solution to (45), (46) and (47) satisﬁes the initial assumption, i.e.,
there exists a payoﬀ consistent path along which all type k ﬁrms do enter.
Given the feasibility of a speciﬁcp a t ho ﬀ the path it is possible to assume
that the economy will follow that speciﬁc path once the punishment phase is
triggered. The values of type 1 ﬁrms for diﬀerent degrees of coordination φ on
the path and oﬀ the path are given in the picture below (9) clearly indicating
that a number of steady states can be enforced with trigger strategies.


























Figure 9: The Values of Staying on the Path and Deviating oﬀ the Path. α =
1/3.5,γ=0 .9,β =0 .95,q=0 .85,a n dk =8 .
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